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It is clearly important to anticipate the environment in which commercial 
banks will make funds management decisions during the next several years. It 
is, of course, impossible to predict accurately all aspects of the future en-
vironment for funds management decisions; however, we can make some reasonable 
inferences about the future environment from economic trends, recent legisla-
tion, and developments in the banking industry. The discussion is divided in-
to three parts -- the economic environment, the regulatory environment, and 
trends in the banking industry. 
The Economic Environment 
The economic environment promises to be challenging for bank funds manag-
ers. It appears likely funds management decisions for the next few years will 
have to be made in an environment of slow real economic growth and rapid 
(probably double-digit) inflation. The primary causes of slow real growth in-
clude the low (relative to other developed western economies) capital base of 
our economy and the limited probability of productivity gains. While positive 
changes in public and private policies may improve the rate of real growth, it 
will take a long time to achieve significant improvement. 
Continuing inflation may be cause for even greater concern for bank funds 
managers. Chart 1, which traces the rates of change for the Consumer Price 
Index over five-year periods, clearly illustrates the increasing rates of in-
flation in recent years. Chart 2 shows the rates of change in the Consumer 
Price Index for six-month periods. This chart illustrates that the rate of 
inflation has varied cyclically with higher peaks and higher troughs in each 
ensuing cycle. Six-month rates of change were in double digits throughout 
1979 and 1980. Progress in reducing the rate of inflation appears likely to 
be slow, for more and more of our economic activity is indexed to price 
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increases. A balanced Federal budget appears to be an illusory target. 
Prices in key areas, such as food and oil, appear likely to be under price 
pressures for the next few years. Finally, our primary hope ·for reduced 
inflation -- rational monetary policy -- seems likely to take several years to 
achieve significant results. 
Two other elements of the corning American economic environment, high in-
terest rates and fluctuating interest rates, appear likely to challenge bank 
funds managers in the next several years. Charts 1 and 2 illustrate the high 
correlation between interest rates and the rate of inflation. Numerous 
studies have concluded that longer-term interest rates tend to exceed the ex-
pected rate of inflation by two to three percent. Thus, a prediction of con-
tinued high levels of interest rates -- as high or higher than in 1979 -- is 
consistent with our inflationary expectations. 
Wide and rapid fluctuation in interest rates also seems very likely in 
the early 1980's. The increasing amplitude of interest rate fluctuations can 
be seen by observing the wide fluctuations in the rate on four- to six-month 
prime commercial paper in Chart 2 and by following data on changes in the 
prime lending rates charged by commercial banks: 







1980 (10 months) 39 
The above data understate the magnitude of changes in the prime rate because 
changes were usually one-quarter of a percent prior to the late 1970's, while 
many prime rate changes in 1979 and 1980 have been one-half or a full percent. 
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Continuation of these rapid and wide fluctuations in interest rates seems 
likely if the Federal Reserve sticks to its October 6, 1979 declaration. In 
essence, the Fed said it will place more emphasis on controlling reserves and 
monetary aggregates and will let interest rates seek their market levels con-
sistent with reserve and monetary goals. The prime rate was 12 percent on 
October 6, 1979, and 18 percent a little over a year later. During that year, 
however, prime has risen to 20 percent, fallen to 11 percent, then risen back 
to 18 percent. Since the rates discussed are increasingly representative of 
the borrowing and lending rates on many bank liabilities and assets, funds 
management at a bank is likely to become increasingly challenging. 
The Regulatory Environment 
Passage of HR 4986, the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary 
Control ACt of 1980, on March 31, 1980 will probably lead to greater changes 
in bank funds management than any legislation since the 1930's. The act in-
cludes nine titles on far-reaching and diverse subjects including monetary 
control and reserve requirements, a phaseout of deposit interest-rate ceil-
ings~ nationwide authorization of NOW accounts, expanded asset and liability 
powers for thrift institutions, fees for services provided by the Federal Re-
serve, preemption of state usury laws, and simplification of truth-in-lending. 
The purpose in this paper is to describe the primary ways the Act will affect 
funds management in coming years. 
Table 1 summarizes the primary immediate and longer-run impact on funds 
management of the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control 
Act of 1980. The primary objective of standardization and broader applicabil-
ity of reserve requirements is better control of the money supply. The lower 
percentage requirements applied to more banks and the greater limitation in 
the types of deposits covered means ni.ost banks will have increased earning 
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assets and, ceteris paribus, increased earnings as a result of this stairstep 
change which will be completed for banks and thrift institutions by 1988. A 
small number of banks, and most thrift institutions, will have higher re-
serves, which will reduce earning assets and hurt earnings. Longer-run funds 
management effects will probably include a more equitable competitive environ-
ment and decreased variation of relative growth rates among various types of 
deposits. The Federal Reserve still will not pay interest on reserves left 
with it; however, the door for that was partially opened. The Federal Reserve 
can pay a return up to what its securities portfolio earned during the previ-
ous calender quarter on accounts above required reserves and on the special 
supplemental required reserves (the maximum allowed is 4 percent of transac-
tion accounts) the Federal Reserve is permitted to impose under certain situa-
tions. 
HR. 498'6 required the Federal Reserve to price its services, such as 
check-clearing and collection, settlement, wire transfer, and float, at their 
estimated full cost plus a mark-up so that the resulting prices would be simi-
lar to those charged by private business. When the Fed's prices become ef-
fective in 1981, banks will have to pay increased explicit cost to the Fed for 
services. While there is some chance that the demand for Federal Reserve ser-
vices will rise because more bank and thrift institutions may use them, in my 
opinion most banks will seek other sources which will provide the needed ser-
vices in a more efficient (i.e., less costly) manner. The longer-run effects 
of Federal Reserve pricing will probably include: changes in "cash manage-
ment" practices of banks; further reduction in bank and Federal Reserve float; 
greater reliance by correspondent banks on explicit pricing than on balances; 
and realistic bank pricing of retai~ transaction deposit services. I also be-
lieve that Federal Reserve pricing will provide additional stimulus to elec-
tronic banking, i.e., debit cards, direct deposits, ATM's, POS's, etc. 
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The approval for NOW accounts nationwide, which is effective at the 
beginning of 1981, will lead to higher interest expense for transaction-type 
deposits. Higher interest expenses may particularly hurt smaller, retailed-
oriented banks whose · profitability has been more dependent on having substan-
tial amounts in low-cost demand deposits. In addition, the reserves on sav-
ings accounts that are switche.d to NOW accounts will be twelve percent for the 
transaction accounts rather than three percent for savings accounts. Never-
theless, in the longer run, NOW accounts also offer positive opportunities to 
bank funds management. Personal transaction balances should be higher and 
more stable, and there should be fewer unwanted returned checks and over-
drafts. NOW accounts may be the forerunner of one-account banking. Setting 
the appropriate levels for NOW-pricing factors, such as minimum balances and 
any fee and service charges, will be an important funds management decision in 
the 1980's. 
The gradual phase-out of Regulation Q ceilings, if completed in 1986 ac-
cording to schedule, will probably have the most far-reaching effect on bank 
funds management. There will probably be a gradual increase in the interest 
cost of many types of bank funds, and there will be increased pressures on 
bank margins. The impact will be greatest on many retail banks, which will 
find the maximum interest they can pay on nearly all of their bank deposits, 
including NOW accounts, rising regularly. Intense competition from other 
banks and thrifts and predicted high interest raDes in the economy are likely 
to keep most banks at these maximums. Furthermore, competition on the lending 
side is likely to keep most banks from maintaining their interest margins. As 
t i me passes, the emphasis in funds acqui s i t i on is l i ke ly to shift f rom quanti-
ty to product design and pricing. There will probably be less variation in 
the relative size and growth of various types of deposits and emphasis on 
explicit interest rather than on premiums. 
6 
Several other parts of HR 4986 will also affect bank funds management in 
coming years. The increase in insurance of private deposits from $40,000 to 
$100,000 will mean higher insurance fees, but should enable banks to better 
distinguish their deposit products from competing nonbank products. Expanded 
deposit and lending powers for thrifts should increase competition for obtain-
ing and profitably using bank funds. !he interest spread between attracting 
and employing funds may narrow; however, banks have several key advantages, 
such as greater experience and expertise and a more flexible asset structure. 
Finally, the section providing for relaxation of existing usury laws in many 
states means lending rates can be more consistent with existing market rates. 
This relaxation should reduce artificial barriers to funds allocation and 
should enhance the ability of banks to hold interest margins stable over the 
business cycle. 
Changes in funds management as HR 4986 becomes effective should be sig-
nificant; however, the law has several important deficiencies which may or may 
not be resolved by future legislation or regulation. For example, there is no 
provision ror removing the remaining constraints on interstate expansi on by 
banks or bank holding companies. Restrictions now imposed under Glass-
Steagall, such as those aimed at commingled investment accounts, were not ad-
dressed. The continuing c ompetitive advantages of money market funds were 
largely ignored. The longer-run implications of the fact that low yielding, 
fixed-rate mortgages will remain a significant part of the portfolios of most 
t hrift insti tutions and many banks for some years to come was not expl icitly 
considered. These and similar problems cannot be ignored. In my opini on, the 
problem is that banking legislation and regulation tend to be following, not 
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leading, influences on bank funds management. Legislation and regulation tend 
to validate or legitimize successful innovations in the banking and depository 
industry. 
Looking at current trends, some legislative or regulatory developments 
seem likely for the near future. One is some form of relaxation of state 
boundary constraints in providing some financial services. These constraints 
are already partly overcome by Edge Act offices, loan production offices, and 
bank holding company subsidiaries, but using such loophole opportunities is 
not particularly efficient. Improved electronic technology and the need for 
domestic rather than international takeovers of "weakened" depository institu-
tions should provide added incentives for some kind of legislative or regula-
tory action. My prediction is that, before the mid-1980's, we will see at 
least regional, and probably nationwide, banking permitted. 
I am less optimistic about other legislative relief because HR 4986 was 
passed in the crisis environment of March 1980. The probability of more sig-
nificant bank legislation in the near-term seems low. Banks must instead 
learn to live in the regulatory environment of HR 4986. Key areas in which 
some type of action may be forced on legislative or regulatory bodies include 
definitions of nontraditional financial services banks can provide; ground 
rules for how far money market funds, brokerage firms, and other nondepository 
firms can go in competing with depository institutions without constraint; 
payment of interest on reserves; and some form of relief for institutions 
holding significant amounts of previously-acquired, low-:·fixed-.return mort-
gages. 
Trends in the Banking Industry 
Finally, in reviewing the environment for funds management decisions in 
coming years, we need to review the current status of the banking industry 
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itself. How much flexibility will the industry have to face the challenging 
external and regulatory environment? Will coming technology help or hurt the 
industry in future years? Will competitive pressure by intra- or inter-
industry? 
Table 2 shows that in 1950, as a result of the Depression and World War 
II, commercial banks held over sixty percent of their total assets in cash and 
due from banks accounts or in Treasury securities. At the same time funds 
were acquired primarily through checking accounts. Demand deposits made up 
over seventy percent of total liabilities and capital in 1950. The low aver-
age return of banking assets -- caused by the bank asset mix and low interest 
rates -- meant that banks paid relatively low returns on time and savings 
deposits and were often not aggressive in trying to obtain funds from such 
deposits. 
The primary emphasis in bank management during the 1950's and early 
1960's was a shift from Treasury securities and cash and due from banks ac-
counts to riskier assets with higher returns. While there was some increased 
emphasis on time and savings deposits as sources of funds, demand deposits 
still contributed well over half the total sources of funds for most banks. 
Furthermore, total deposits and assets of all commercial banks grew at an an-
nual rate of less than five percent from 1950 through 1964. During this peri-
od, the combined assets of nonbank financial intermediaries grew at an annual 
rate of roughly twelve percent. Causes of this low growth in banks vis-a-vis 
other financial institutions included (1) slow demand deposit growth as cor-
porate treasurers began to utilize efficient cash management techniques; (2) 
significantly lower average rates paid on time and savings deposits than those 
paid by many other intermediaries; and (3) generally conservative attitudes 
toward attracting funds by bank managers. 
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The prevailing philosophy of bank managers and directors appeared to 
emphasize the profitable lending of attracted funds, at the cost of additional 
risk. The excess liquidity and low portfolio credit risk of banks during the 
immediate postwar period was substantially reduced. Table 2 illustrates that 
from 1950 to 1964 cash and due from banks accounts and Treasury securities 
fell from sixty-one to forty percent of bank assets, while loans rose from 
thirty-one to forty-nine percent. 
In the early and mid-1960's, banks responded to their relatively slow 
growth during the preceding decade by (1) requiring loan customers to keep 
larger demand deposit balances; (2) paying competitive rates on time and sav-
ings accounts within the confines of Regulation Q; and (3) aggressively offer-
ing certificates of deposit, savings certificates, and other old and new li-
ability sources. Emphasis in management shifted from asset selection to the 
acquisition of funds -- liability management. This more aggressive acquisi-
tion of funds was part of a shift in bank strategy away from high margins and 
slow growth and toward lower margins with more rapid growth in the early and 
mid-1950's. This shift was encouraged by gradual relaxing of Regulation Q, 
which set the maximum rates banks could pay on time and savings deposits, and 
by allowing banks to use certificates of deposit and other liability forms to 
compete more effectively for funds. The strong demand for credit from the 
mid-1960's through the 1970's allowed banks to employ the substantially larger 
amounts of funds they were able to attract. 
The surge in asset and loan growth was pronounced -- the rate of asset 
growth doubled to rates averaging nearly ten percent annually from 1962 
through 1979. By comparison, in this same period, the assets of nonbank fi-
nancial intermediaries grew at an average annual rate of slightly less than 
seven percent. 
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The change in the composition and financing of this growth was even more 
remarkable. Demand deposits declined from fifty-five percent of total liabil-
ities and capital in the mid-1960's to slightly under thirty percent of total 
liabilities and capital by the end of 1979. Time and savings deposits in-
creased from thirty-three percent of total liabilities and capital in the 
early 1960's to fifty percent by 1979. Borrowing and other liabilities in-
creased from a relatively small source of funds to nearly fourteen percent of 
total liabilities and capital in this same period. On the asset side, cash 
and due from banks accounts and Treasury securities declined absolutely as 
well as relatively, while loans continued their rapid growth (increasing from 
forty-nine to sixty-one percent of total assets from 1964 through 1979), and 
other securities (nearly all of which are state and local issues) increased 
rapidly from ten to thirteen percent of total assets. 
These broad trends indicate banks will probably be exposed to greater 
risk in the early 1980's than they have been at any time since the early De-
pression years. Options, such as conversion from low-cost, core demand and 
savings deposits to interest-sensitive deposits and shifts from securities to 
higher-earning, higher risk loans, have already been partially utilized. 
Flexibility of bank funds managers is very limited in the challenging economic 
and regulatory environment predicted (in the preceding section) for the 
1980's. 
Technological changes in the 1980's complicate efforts to predict how 
many banks will fare in coming years. The pace of technological change for 
banks has been slower than many predicted in the last few years. On average, 
the industry is still dominated by a paper-based brick-and-mortar, customer-
bank-employee-interaction delivery system. There are, however, recent devel-
opments which indicate substantive movement away from this system is taking 
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place. The technology exists to alter banks' delivery systems rapidly. This 
technology consists of advances in computer capabilities, which permit easy 
and inexpensive gathering, storing, analyzing, and retrieving of customer data 
and of advances in communication hardware and software which permits conveni-
ent access to customer records at great distances. In my opinion, we are at 
the threshold of a veritable revolution in the delivery system which has sig-
nificant implications for banking and bank funds management. 
In less than five years, I believe, the vast majority of bank transac-
tions will be by electronic impulse made away from the bank's physical loca-
tion. With existing technology, automated clearing housing, direct payroll 
crediting, direct bill paying, widespread use of debit cards and POS termi-
nals, and disappearance of float appear highly likely. The technology exists 
and is being implemented by larger firms and their banks. Furthermore, on a 
trial basis, some individuals can sit at home and pay bills, make deposits, 
shift among types of deposits, shift form deposits to other financial assets, 
etc., all by electronic impulse. 
While in the long run I believe this technology will increase productivi-
ty and reduce costs in banking, the transition period will be difficult. This 
difficulty is compounded by the trying economic and regulatory environment 
predicted for coming years. Some banks will be willing and able to take the 
high costs and risk involved while others may still try to drag their feet. 
The foot-draggers may find themselves rapidly becoming noncompetitive. 
The preceding statement leads to my final area of discussion concerning 
the status of banking -- the competitive environment. I disagree with the 
contention that banks' main competition will come from other banks. This con-
tention seems to be based on the idea that other depository institutions will 
be unable to compete because of their inferior asset position and lack of 
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experience in many banking areas and that banks will somehow be protected from 
competition of nondepository organizations. 
I . believe nearly exactly the opposite will occur. Some large thrifts 
will be very competitive in both attracting and employing funds. Nondeposi-
tory organizations will use their substantial competitive edge -- less re-
strictions, no reserves, no capital requirements, ·less regulation -- to offer 
more and more banklike financial services. Some of the nondepository organi-
zations providing banklike services are known. For example, much has been 
written about money market firms, brokerage firms like Merrill Lynch, and 
large retail chains such as Sears and Penneys offering competitive financial 
services. Rapid expansion by such organizations in areas competitive with 
banks appears likely. Furthermore, additional organizations, such as ·life in-
surance companies, some large industrial companies, and private pension funds, 
are looking carefully ~t segments of banking services they believe would be 
profitable for themselves. 
Conclusions 
~here does the combination of a hostile economic environment, a changing 
regulatory environment, and some worrisome trends in the banking industry 
leave the bank funds manager? The environment for bank funds management de-
cisions is clearly going to be a challenging one in corning years. I sincerely 
believe, however, the well-managed banks can and will be very successful in 
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es that are switched 
-Greater discretion in product design of savings instruments-
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-Reliance on explicit interest instead of premiums; enhanced 
l value of ''one-stop banking" 
Sears, Atrerican Express, and Merrill Lynch 
~Potential for marketing distinction vis-a-vis Money Market Funds, 
--~ · · . . - . 
-Greater carpetition for obtaining and profitably using bank funds 
-Narrowing of spread between attracting and employing funds 
- - --~--
-Enhanced ability to hold interest margin stable over credit 
cycles 
-Reduced artifical barrier on fund allocation 
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